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Due to their close relation to physical and virtual entities (humans,
machines, processes, etc.) including their changing state and con-
text, modern cyber-physical and IoT systems exhibit a high degree
of architectural dynamicity. While sharing of data among all the
entities of the system is the key driver to the efficiency of the sys-
tem, it is at the same time necessary to effectively control which
data are shared, with whom, and in which context so as to prevent
potential misuse. The problem however is that traditional methods
to security and privacy, which typically rely on rigid hierarchies,
cannot easily cope with the high degree of architectural dynamicity.
In this paper, we outline an approach to ensure security and privacy
on the architectural level in systems with dynamic architectures.
In particular, we focus on a) data tracking using data flows and
data processing described in system architectures, b) descriptions
of dynamic sharing scenarios including decision derivation based
on the current situation, and c) a runtime analysis platform that
regulates data exchange. We ground the approach and illustrate it
in the Industry 4.0 setting, as this is the domain in which we apply
our approach as part of our project Trust 4.0, but we believe it can
be used in other applications domains as well.
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• Applied computing → Supply chain management; • Secu-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern cyber-physical and IoT [8] systems (CPS) [5] are distributed
software-intensive systems that combinemobile deviceswith server-
side computation. The applications of CPS are numerous ranging
from smart homes, smart cities, smart electric grids, smart mobility
to the recent initiative of optimizing and customizing production
and industrial processes, termed Industry 4.0 [10], which enacts
ad-hoc cooperation between machines, humans, and organizations
in supply and production chains.
An important aspect of a CPS is that its entities are bound to
physical entities such as humans (via smartphones or other end-
user terminals), machines, and virtual entities such as suppliers,
producers, and processes. This implies that the architecture of a
modern CPS becomes a rather complex structure, which dynami-
cally changes (i.e. entities and communication emerge and disap-
pear) based on movement, ad-hoc cooperation and interactions,
as well as constantly changing context of entities. This is further
exacerbated by changing goals and behavior of the entities, which
for instance in Industry 4.0 comes from the very high variability of
the production process.
An important problem in this settings is that the inherent ar-
chitectural dynamicity contradicts with current privacy and trust
mechanisms and makes them unsuitable since they are built around
assumptions of rigid hierarchical architectures. To overcome this
issue, overall behavior of a system has to be described and bound
to a set of situations reflecting the dynamic cooperations and con-
text. This behavior then needs to be reflected in privacy and trust
mechanisms.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to privacy and trust
tied to the dynamic architecture of the ad-hoc dynamic cooperation.
We establish privacy by ensuring confidentiality according to poli-
cies. This establishes trust between data sharing parties because
the system prohibits information leaks. Though it applies to the
whole class of modern CPS, we ground it in the Industry 4.0 as we
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develop it in the frame of our project Trust 4.0, which focuses on
trust in Industry 4.0.
Our approach combines the architectural modeling of a system in
the Palladio ComponentModel (PCM) and the concept of autonomic
entity ensembles to capture dynamic situations in the system and
related privacy and trust requirements. In the paper, we show how
to model a system with our approach and additionally, we discuss
our preliminary work on runtime analysis and enforcement of
the security and privacy in the dynamic context along with our
initial prototypes and emerging results. The paper concludes with
a research road-map.
2 RUNNING EXAMPLE
As a running example for the paper, we use a case stemming from
real deployments of ValueStreamer[7]; that is, a commercial prod-
uct by CAS software company – co-authors of this paper. Val-
ueStreamer is a shop floor management system that delivers lean
management principles and data sharing across the entire supply
chain (SC). In the running example, we consider ValueStreamer to
be used by a car manufacturer and its entire SC including multi-
ple potential suppliers of car brakes and tires. The ValueStreamer
delivers data — such as error rates of production machines — to
stakeholders within and across organizations. The knowledge of
error rates allows stakeholders to monitor, predict, and optimize
the production process. However, the error rates constitute sensi-
tive information; hence, the ValueStreamer has to control access to
them.
The permission to share data depends on the context as well as
on the particular business process involved and its stakeholders’
roles, time and date, the participant SC entity and its members, the
specific time window for data sharing, the sharing location, and
the provenance of the data across SC. For instance with respect to
production machine error rates: (1) different departments within
the brake supplier have heads of department with access to error
rates of machines of his/her particular department but not to error
rates of machines in other departments of the same factory. (2)
The head of engineering responsible for a particular manufacturing
process has access to error rates but only of machines involved
in the process and time-wise related to the process. (3) A subcon-
tractor’s technician fixing a machine may see its detailed rates log
but only together with a technician of the department responsible
for the machine. (4) The brake supplier wants to share its error
rates with the head of a subsidiary company — to allow for quality
improvement — but only after proper anonymization to not reveal
details of the manufacturing process.
Note that while scenario #1 is a rather traditional case where a
static organizational structure determines data sharing, scenario #2
and #3 are rather dynamic because they depend on the dynamically
changing manufacturing process. Additionally, scenario #3 allows
sharing only within the context of a coordinated action involving
multiple stakeholders. Scenario #4 adds in the topic of data aggre-
gation and anonymization,like only sharing aggregated values over
a certain time frame, whereby organizations can only share data
with a certain privacy level (i.e. they are not too sensitive).
3 STATE OF THE ART
There is a lot of research in the area of testing and establishing
privacy of software systems. Our approach, especially, aims for
preserving confidentiality of specific data in software design, and
software operation. Therefore, the areas of confidentiality analyses,
access control, security enforcement and data sensitivity are closely
related to our work.
We distinguish confidentiality analyses by the development
phase they take place in. During design time, there are high-level
approaches such as Threat Modeling [20] that check coarse-grained
system descriptions for security degrading flaws in a creative pro-
cess. In case of changes, this is cumbersome because they do not
use the same models as architects and developers. Hoisl et. al. [11]
use object flows to ensure confidentiality and integrity during ob-
ject transmissions in service-oriented architecture designs. They,
however, do not analyze access rights but only ensure transmission
of sensitive data via secured links. UMLSec [12] ensures secure
communication as well but also considers role based access control.
The definition of confidentiality takes place on the control rather
than the data flow, which complicates formulating access control
constraints.
During the implementation, information flow analyses such as
Joana [19] or code verification approaches such as KeY [2] detect
information leaks. Both, however, require the actual implementa-
tion to be available as source code. Additionally, the approaches
do not scale well for large, complex industry 4.0 scenarios but re-
quire partitioning the analyzed system. They are also specific to
one programming language. In heterogeneous environments like
they exist in an industry 4.0 setting, they are not applicable.
Approaches such as SecureUML [13] provide access control spec-
ifications. A modeler specifies roles, permissions, and users in a
stereotyped UML diagram. The specification happens at design-
time, which is problematic in Industry 4.0 environment, where roles
can change rapidly and multiple different parties interact.
In security enforcement, we see relations to approaches build-
ing new enforcement platforms, and approaches for generating
inputs for existing platforms. MDSE@R [3] is a combination of
security specification and enforcement platform. The enforcement
platform uses aspect-oriented programming to include security in
existing applications without changing their source code. Even if
new platforms are promising, we aim for integrating our approach
into existing enforcement platforms and generate inputs for them.
Another research field in industry 4.0 is data sensitivity. This
was considered in the QoCIM framework [15], which is based
on Quality-of-Context (QoC) analyses considering the impact on
sharing different levels of sensitive data. The researchers define
trust-based context contracts [14], which are dynamic and devel-
oped independently of the contract sides. Furthermore, the contract
changes could be in modification of trust, visibility circles, and
context data. They, however, define trust in terms of quality of
meta-data rather then in terms of confidentiality.
A common problem of all the approaches above is that they lack
the ability to capture highly dynamic situations where multiple
parties jointly coordinate together towards a common goal. We
further combine this with the notion of privacy levels to enable
sharing of data that has been properly anonymized.
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4 SOLUTION OVERVIEW
Our approach features two types of models: (1) models of data flows
and data manipulation, as well as (2) models of privacy require-
ments bound to dynamic situations. We constantly update these
models during runtime to reflect dynamic changes in the system
and its execution context. Models of data flows (1) serve for describ-
ing the system and the processes in it. This model is inherently
dynamic in the sense that it describes the individual data flows and
that the overall system behavior emerges as a result of instantiation
of the data flows depending on the current situation (i.e. the context
which consists of current suppliers, products currently manufac-
tured, etc.). Models of privacy requirements (2) use the same notion
of a situation and connect it to statements about permitted and
disallowed sharing of data. Having these two types of models, we
perform a runtime analysis (which itself can be considered the
third constituent of our approach), in which we track how data
flows dynamically emerge and ensure that the data flows comply
to the contextual privacy requirements. In the subsection below,
we briefly exemplify these three parts of our approach.
4.1 Models of Data Flows
We describe and analyze the systems on an architectural level using
the established Palladio Component Model (PCM) [17]. The PCM is
a collection of multiple models that describe the system, its behavior,
and its usage. A repository model describes software components
(i.e. reusable building blocks of software), their required and pro-
vided interfaces, data types, and the component behavior. A system
model describes offered services and how the system provides them
by connecting instances of components. A resource model and an
allocation model describe available hardware and deployment of
components to this hardware. Usage models describe how users
use the system by calling offered services. A data flow modeling
extension [18] allows specifying data processing in more detail.
PCM subsystems allow representing multiple connected systems
and their data interchange.
We use this behavior description to determine security properties
of data processed in systems that confidentiality contracts can use in
their specification. The following paragraphs describe the behavior
model, while Subsection 4.2 describes the contracts. We cover the
actual analysis in Subsection 4.3. In our explanation, we use scenario

















Figure 1: Simplified system architecture including data pro-
cessing.
The basic idea of data flow modeling in PCM is making data
instances explicit and extending existing actions in control flows
with explicit data acquisition, emission, and processing. Data in-
stances have a certain data type and additional characteristics that,
for instance, can describe access rights, granularity of sensor data,
owners, or a privacy level. In Figure 1, we use the data type Error-
Rate and the privacy characteristic priv. Possible privacy levels are
confidential C and restricted R in this example. Data acquisition
and emission can take place on service parameters, return values,
or internal component stores. Data processing consists of a chain
of data processors that take input data and produce output data.
In our example, the error rates are gathered from the machines.
Afterwards, theMachineStatus component calculates the average of
the error rates and sends this data to the calling MachineReporting
component. Each data processor can have an effect on the charac-
teristics associated with the data instance. In our example, the avg
operator takes a list of error rates and converts it into an average
error rate per machine. This reduces the confidentiality level from
confidential to restricted. In this way, we derive the confidentiality
level of data at a given location in the architecture from the modeled
behavior.
4.2 Models of Trust Contracts
To reflect the architectural dynamics of the Industry 4.0 processes in
the definition of privacy and trust contracts, we exploit the concept
of autonomic entity ensembles [4]. An ensemble is an architectural
construct that models a group of entities, which dynamically coor-
dinate to achieve a common goal. An entity can be a PCM software
component but can be a domain concept such as a person using the
system as well.
A typical example of an ensemble in the smart cyber-physical
domain would be a group of cars that jointly coordinate to discover
and reserve parking places. The definition of an ensemble typically
consists of two parts: (a) membership constraint, which expresses
which entity instances and under which condition form ensembles,
and (b) group goal, which captures the functional purpose of the
ensembles. Typically, the group goal would be to exchange data
or to perform a coordinated action. The same ensemble definition
can be instantiated simultaneously multiple times, which naturally
corresponds to the fact that different groups of entities at different
places and times can pursue a similar goal.
In the context of trust in Industry 4.0, we use an ensemble to
represent trust contracts between particular domain entities (e.g.
persons, organizations, places, equipment) in a given situation.
The membership constraint describes which particular entities (i.e.
instances) and in which particular situation they participate in the
ensemble. The group goal in this case is the enforcement of privacy.
This takes the form of permission of certain data sharing between
the entities participating in the ensemble.
This is illustrated in Listing 1 and 2, which show scenarios #3 and
#4 respectively. Due to space constraints, we omit the declaration
of entities and the ensembles for scenarios #1 and #2. They can be
found at [1]. The membership is represented by the role selector,
which identifies entities that can act in the ensemble based on their
types and properties. Additional constraints over the entities can
be specified in the optional where section. The permitted sharing
is defined by allow, which defines the subject, object, data, and an
optional required privacy level.
4.3 Trust Analysis
The goal of the trust analysis is to provide decision making for trust
enforcement platforms. The analysis consists of two steps: First,
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class SharingWithServiceman(val machine: Machine) extends Ensemble {
val servicemen = role(ent it ies .se lect[Person] . f i l ter(_ .hasRole{ case Serviceman(machine) =>
true } ) )
val accomp = role(ent it ies .se lect[Person] . f i l ter(_ .hasRole{ case
Technician(machine.department) => true } ) )
where( servicemen.al l (svc => accomp.some(acc => svc . locat ion == acc . locat ion)) )
a l low(servicemen, machine, "errorRates")
}
Listing 1: Ensemble-based specification of sharing
rule in scenario #3
class SharingWithSubsidiary(val company: Company) extends Ensemble {
val machines = role(ent it ies .se lect[Machine] . f i l ter(_ .company == company))
val persons = role(ent it ies .se lect[Person] . f i l ter(
_ .hasRole{ case HeadOfCompany(subsidiary) => subsidiary .parentCompany == company } ) )
a l low(persons , machines , "sum(errorRates)" , Pr ivacyLevel .RESTRICTED)
}
Listing 2: Ensemble-based specification of sharing
rule in scenario #4
a PCM runtime analysis determines system characteristics such
as privacy levels of emitted data. Second, the Trait-based Coali-
tion Formation Framework (TCOOF) [6] evaluates ensembles and
derives decisions by means of access permissions. Given the work-
in-progress status of our approach, we did not evaluate the fully
integrated trust analysis yet but describe the envisioned analysis.
The PCM runtime analysis determines the characteristics of a
given data at a given location in the architecture. In scenario #4, the
characteristic is the privacy level. The location in the architecture
is the transmission link between the systems of a vendor and a sub-
sidiary. The analysis determines the characteristics by collecting
the data processors of all possible paths this data can have taken
to the location and calculating the effect of the processing to the
characteristics. For instance, applying an average operator can re-
duce the privacy level of data. To cope with dynamic changes of the
systems and their execution contexts, we use an approach to update
the initial models during runtime [9] based on observed changes.
Thereby, we can consider changes in deployment, assembling, and
data processing in the involved systems. All of these changes can
have an effect on the data characteristics and are important for
consistent decision making.
The actual decision making for trust contracts essentially con-
sists of two steps: (i) determining which contracts are relevant in the
current context, and (ii) deciding on allowing/denying data sharing
based on the relevant contracts. (i) is a relatively novel problem
specific to systems with a high degree of dynamism (as is the case
of Industry 4.0). In our approach, we address (i) by transforming
the ensemble definitions to a constraint solving problem. In this
problem, the membership constraints form constraints of the prob-
lem. The available entities (i.e. instances) form variable domains
and membership of an entity in a specific ensemble is reflected as
a variable in the constraint problem. For initial results here, we
exploit our existing framework TCOOF, which we have adapted
for supporting the security-oriented DSL as shown in the examples
above. The code can be found at [1]. It allows us to capture the
ensembles via internal Scala DSL (as already shown in Listing 1
and 2). The framework evaluates the ensembles using available
context information such as the privacy level of data to be shared
and provides the answer to which trust contracts are currently
active and to which entities they apply. Internally, TCOOF employs
the Choco constraint solver [16]. The use of the solver allows for
keeping the complexity of evaluation manageable and benefit from
state-space pruning algorithms employed in the solver. The actual
decision (ii) is derived from the results of the active ensembles.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we outlined the Trust 4.0 approach for trust in dy-
namic supply chain environments. We showed how the dynamics of
domains as Industry 4.0 can be addressed in architectural modeling
and reflected in security and privacy that goes beyond traditional
static hierarchies of roles and support situation-dependent security
that regulates coordination among multiple parties.
Our approach is still in a prototypical stage and there are already
many open issues, which we need to address. Looking at the issues
as a research roadmap, we see the following general problems:
(1) In the future we plan to investigate how to design a domain
specific language for specifying systems and security requirements,
that users without software development background understand
them. (2) Also we want to investigate, what security and privacy
guarantees we can give at design time when the whole system is
dynamic. (3) At last the we want to further inverstigate the scalibily
and decentralize security and privacy.
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